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FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE TO THE ANALYSING SITUATION[1]

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The analytic method relies on the mental capacity to produce an associative sequence, and, afterwards, to discern its unconscious logic; within the social practice of the analytic cure, the method presents itself as the mastered enactment of the condition through which free association proves to be possible, interpretable and beneficial. There is a contradiction between the necessity of relying on a former theorisation and that of willingly suspending a knowledge that might serve the authenticity of the experience. The author reminds us of the structural links between the fundamental rule and the defined situations within which the analytic process of transformative investigation can take place. He raises the problems that it is suggested arise with the initial objectivation method by acknowledging the transference as the created–found object of interpretation. He shows how the transformation of the patient into analysand implies the functional introjection of the various elements contained by the analytic site. The meaning given to the expression 'analysing situation' is made explicit. The crucial value of the process of enunciation is illustrated by a brief example.

For André Green:

'Though this be madness, yet there is method in't'
Hamlet, Act II, 211

SOME KEY ASPECTS OF THE METHOD

1) Any attempt to define the analytic method is immediately confronted with the contrast between what the term method suggests in the way of controlled organisation, and the renunciation of control implied by free association. No doubt this paradox of *methodic unreason* was necessary if the *Ucs* was to open itself to rational investigation.

In its immanence, the method cannot be distinguished from the manner in which the psyche proves itself capable of producing an associative sequence and of discerning an unconscious logic in it afterwards. When one thinks about it, the method cannot easily be separated from the theory of the psyche, which makes it possible to interpret the sequence and think about the hypothesis of the *Ucs*. In this respect, by writing *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Freud went to the very heart of the matter: the telling of dreams and their interpretation finds its continuation in the theorisation on the work that produces them.

2) At another level, the method provides the link between this Freudian invention, its scientific reference (positivist) and the demands of clinical practice, which needed to demonstrate its validity as an applicable medical technique. Thus in accordance with the project of an analytic cure, the method consists in carefully creating the conditions in which free association proves to be practicable, interpretable and beneficial. A contradiction emerges at the heart of these conditions between those based on

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acquired knowledge, theoretical and practical, and those that prescribe the suspension of this knowledge so that the encounter with the *Ucs* is authentic. Knowledge does tend to predetermine the finality of the experience, and even to give the method a quasi-programmatic dimension. Hence the importance of the capacity to function *negatively* in order to preserve the loss of the ordinary references of meaning that the shared associative process entails and also the hazardous dimension of the *après-coup* in which there is an attempt to find meaning through interpretation. In addition to floating attention, a learned ignorance (Lacan) or negative capacity (Bion) are also qualities said to characterise the analyst in his work. This contradiction reveals the need for the element of thirdness, for which the method is the safeguard.

3) Retrospectively, certain initial aspects of the method now appear to have been more or less adequate responses to this requirement, which became all the more imperative because analysis needed to shake off the hypnotic 'influence'.

a) Freud's preference for a method operating *per via di levare* corresponded in part to his assertion that the analyst and the situation should introduce nothing foreign into the patient's mind. This asepsis meant that the method simply allowed unconscious processes to manifest themselves, and that interpretation merely revealed the meaning of what was already there in the repressed. Nowadays, no one doubts that the analyst and the analytic situation participate, *nolens volens*, in the structuring of the phenomena in process.

b) In the first place, the method postulates a conscious ego-subject, capable of observing a part of his internal world in order to make it an object of investigation. The very development of the method would show how this ego is subverted by the *Ucs* and how precarious the observer–observed distinction is (for the analyst as well).

It was difficult to get beyond these initial responses, which were often institutionalised. Evidence of this may be found, for instance, in Freud's attachment to the material truth of memories, before he was able to authenticate the conviction arising from a construction, and its indirect associative confirmation, and then sift out the notion of historical truth. Conceived of as a neutral agency of objectivisation, the method seemed, in effect, to guarantee the objective validity of the knowledge acquired and the results obtained. Is it not the case that there is still a widespread conviction that the truth of analysis can be validated by studies aimed at objectivising the initial development?

Psychoanalysis is currently exploring what it can learn from other scientific models (self-organisation, determinist chaos, new conceptions of history, etc.) that are compatible with the specific requirements of its own discipline.

4) The function of the third party can no longer provide any sort of prior guarantee. Its specific role is one of *producing thirdness* (Green, 1989), an essential factor in the dynamics of a process that sometimes causes it to disappear.

The adventure of transference situates the desire for alienation, inherent in the intersubjective relationship, at the heart of analytic activity. There is always a risk that the experience will comply with the analyst's desire and his theoretical preconceptions. Freud draws attention to the unavoidable ambiguity of this when he says that, at a certain level, a hypothesis can no longer be distinguished from the phenomenon it relates to. This is why it is necessary to confer a specific value on the *gap between theory and practice in analysis*; for it is not *de facto* but involves an ethical prescription that is related to the respect for otherness.

This gap is the object of a constant conflict in inter-analytic exchanges between the 'scientific' desire to fill it and the humanistic requirement to confirm its irreducibility.

5) Because of the increasing complexity of the psychoanalyst's function, descriptions of method tend to be focused on his functioning, the modalities of which are sustained by his particular gifts, his own analysis and training, and ultimately inform his interpretive creations.

This description is rendered all the more accessible and open to theoretical elaboration in that the analyst combines within himself both subjective experience and his/the theorisation. But for this very reason, it activates the self-referential danger that threatens psychoanalysis and the temptation to turn the psychoanalyst into an omnipotent 'technical subjectivity'.

a) This is illustrated, for instance, by modern theories of countertransference. Originally, countertransference was conceived of as something disturbing the analyst's function: this was a narrow point of view, but one which drew attention to the gap between subject and function, the symbolic support of the function. A wider theoretical outlook takes into account the structural character of the psychoanalyst's subjective involvement, as well as the principle of the potential functioning of that part of it which is accessible to him. This unquestionably results in broadening the basis of the function. But there is an increased danger of the gap between subject and function disappearing; either because, for example, the analyst ends up candidly making a function out of his subjectivity; or, because he thinks of his function as being indefinitely relevant and malleable, once the countertransference capacities are there. Yet, is it not necessary for the method to place an elaborative reference point (dialectical) between the limits of the analyst and the limits of the analysis—which after all are the correlate of its consistency?

b) Moreover, faced with a commonplace impasse in the transference–countertransference situation, the analyst quickly sees that the *Ucs* remains the *Ucs*, and that his capacity to use his countertransference and self-analysis is strictly limited. What can he learn, then, from the method? Quite simply, by returning to the beginning by doing another period of analysis or supervision. In so doing, he rediscovers the original challenge, i.e. speaking by associating in order to give a chance to the interpretive *après-coup*.

The listening situation, then, is part and parcel of the method: it is an inter-analytic annexe of the analytic situation in which countertransference can take the place of transference.

6) Centring the method on the analyst goes hand in hand with the temptation of merely seeing the patient as his beneficiary in order to describe the effects he has on him. One of the moving forces of my work has been to draw attention to the fact that the first meaning of the rule—making the patient the active agent of the method—survives the vicissitudes of transference; and that it is the analysand, primarily, who makes the analyst an analyst. My experience as an analyst and consultant has made me particularly sensitive to the attachment that patients—even the most difficult ones—show towards the analytic situation with regard to *its specificity*, the logic of its functioning and its ethics; a sense of attachment that is distinct from—and sometimes in conflict with—that which they show towards the analyst. For them, it is a question of playing by the rules of the game, a key element in the function of creating thirdness. Something essential in the method is at play in the process of self-appropriation through which the patient becomes an analysand.

FROM THE PROCEDURE TO THE RULE

1) It will be worthwhile to return to the definition Freud gave of psychoanalysis in his Encyclopaedia article of 1922 (p. 233). He both linked and distinguished:

—the procedure 'for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way';

—and the method '(based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders'.

The transition from investigation to treatment corresponds to the shift from procedure to method:

—the procedure of free association can be used for pure investigation;

—the method lays down the procedure, which has become the fundamental rule in the 'structured' situation, resulting in a process of *transformative* investigation. This is why the

method can be used *for* a treatment: the psychoanalytic cure consists of *additional* indirect effects, of psychical transformations inherent in the process. Notwithstanding the complexity that has been introduced, we still find the founding postulate of a truth that heals.

2) Freud replaced the panoramic memory of the hypnotised subject with free association. It was up to the patient to actively suspend the exercise of his reason in order to grasp and communicate his incidental *unwelcome* thoughts. The procedure was only introduced originally to investigate an enigmatic phenomenon that was already there, i.e. that of symptoms and dreams whose meaning needed elucidating. There was a clear distinction, then, between this *fixed* object and the subject who participates, with the analyst, in investigating it.

This limitation of the procedure reflected that of the *Ucs* conceived of as a lacuna.

3) In spite of the simplicity of its formulation, the rule contained all the ambiguities that would lead to the analytic situation and its complexity.

a) By suggesting to the patient that he should say everything that comes into his mind, even if it seems nonsensical, unimportant or disagreeable, the rule combines the positive proposition to speak spontaneously, i.e. 'freely', and the *negative* prescription not to shut out incidental thoughts. It makes the *already existing* object of investigation disappear, which implies conventionalising the spatio-temporal limits of the session; and, it suspends the implicit difference between those moments when the patient is speaking in his own name and others when he is talking nonsense while associating. However, it does not prevent the patient from bringing, at the beginning of the session, an object of investigation (an account of a dream, for instance) to which he will have some associations.

b) At the same time, however, announcing the rule favours psychical and discursive factuality in the *here and now*; it places the session under the *virtual* aegis of free association. The analyst, for his part, finds himself immediately in a position to listen associatively to the process of the session; there is thus a gap between the two protagonists that is part of the structural asymmetry of their positions. The crucial question, with regard to the method, is to know how this asymmetry can lead to a division of labour that is functional and not hierarchical since this gap involves a risk of alienation. Which analyst has not been troubled by the observation that he has just heard a transparent associative process during a session in which the patient seems not to have wondered if he was saying something different from what he had intended to say?

c) This danger is inherent in the fact that the rule stipulates implicitly that the object of investigation will be produced in or as a result of the session. The patient's activity becomes, then, both the actual vehicle and the specific object of the investigation. How can the method ensure that concomitance exists between the production and the investigation of an object? Stated in this way, the question elicits but mediocre answers.

The first would be that of alternation. With the psychoanalyst's tacit agreement, the patient rediscovers the initial logic of the procedure: associative investigation follows the presentation of an object.

The second, a caricature, would be that of a permanent split, as in the metaphor of a train journey during which a traveller sitting next to the window describes to the person next to him the changing views he sees outside. The patient ensures there is a disjunction, without interference, between the associative production of a psychical film and a purely informative account collaborating with the investigation.

The third solution would be that of a permanent division of labour, the principle of which is that the analyst's listening *applies the rule* to the patient's functioning. Is it not the case that Freud expected the rule, in an objectivising mode and in the third person, to provide an impartial guarantee that the forces involved in the conflict could be fully manifested? For the experienced analyst the rule is an analyser of the whole of the patient's psychical functioning.

From this point of view, it is the psychoanalyst's interpretation that constitutes, retroactively, the object of investigation, as a result of the choice of 'material' made in the session.

It can be seen that the division of labour makes the patient the producer, and the analyst the investigator. The patient is assumed to be subject to an internal split between subject and object (of investigation); since, in the final analysis, the interpretation has to be addressed to a part of his ego that has remained an observer.

d) The weakness of these responses shows that the rule introduces a rupture with the principle of objectivising the procedure. The distinction between an immobilised object of investigation and its investigation by a conscious subject is erased when confronted with the intra- and inter-subjective logic of an investigation that transforms what it encounters and is itself transformed by the encounter. The process involves the subject's indefinite experience of being decentred. The rule supposes that, through the heterogeneity of the signifiers employed (Green) and the diversity of the forms of enunciation, associative activity is no longer only a means: informed by the subject's self-division, it provides the opportunity for a tangible and troubling perception of *the other scene*; the experience of this drifting takes only one direction: 'the goal is the journey'. As in La Fontaine's fable 'The labourer and his children', associative exploration can finish by substituting the value of working-through for the discovery of the hidden treasure—the *predetermined* finality of the initial procedure.

TRANSFERENCE

The primacy conferred by the rule on here-and-now factuality inevitably implied that the transference would become the object of investigation produced *in* the session. But it also contained the idea that, as it was produced *by* the session, its interpretation required a renewed conception of the analytic situation.

1) Within a short space of time, Freud stated first that the theme of transference should only be interpreted once it had turned into a resistance; and then, that it proved possible to give a new transference meaning all the symptoms of the transference-neurosis (1914, p. 154). From resistance to interpreting, transference thus became the medium of an interpretive function that was obliged to comply with it 'methodically'. But we may wonder whether this progress was not paid for by a slightly restrictive systematic dimension ('succeed in').

2) In 'The dynamics of transference' (1912), Freud refers to the 'immense disadvantage in psychoanalysis as a method' when speaking of the fact that transference, generally speaking the strongest factor in success, can turn into the most powerful vehicle of resistance. I do not want to go back over the way in which he proved that this was only a matter of appearance, and showed how the obstacle is changed into a vehicle of success. But it is not difficult to detect the signs of unease that transference and the exigency of interpreting it constituted for the theory of analytic method as he had conceived of it. I would like to highlight two of these signs:

a) After pointing out that the stoppage of associations is always linked to a transference-idea and observing that as soon as the 'explanation' is given to the patient the stoppage is removed, Freud writes that in case of failure 'the situation is changed from one in which the associations fail into one in which they are being kept back' (1912, p. 101).

b) At the end of the article, and in a manner which stands out from the rest of the text, he emphasises that the highly regressive form taken by the transference actualisation is due 'to the psychological situation in which the treatment places the patient' (p. 107); and, as if to justify its necessity, he concludes 'it is impossible to destroy anyone *in absentia* or *in effigie*' (p. 108). It is clear that resistance in the transference raises the issue of the violence of interpretation as well as that of countertransference: the cause and consequence of the turmoil affecting the method.

It is not very difficult to demonstrate this turmoil. To illustrate the 'acting out' of trans-

ference (*agieren*), Freud cites as an example the case of a man who became mute when the fundamental rule was imparted, owing to the displacement onto the analyst of a conflict with parental authority. It can be seen, then, that the rule, which is supposed, *a priori*, to further the investigation of an intrapsychic conflict, loses its status as a tool and becomes its unconscious factor on the analytic stage. It has lost its referential value of thirdness.

But it has not lost its functional relevance, since the patient has produced an interpretable transference symptom.

Nonetheless, a problem arises with regard to its eventual interpretation, particularly in the absence of an adequate associative context. Is there not a danger of it manifesting the analyst-father's knowledge and power; and of it being perceived—like the formulation of the fundamental rule—as resulting from the position that he occupies in the transference?

Thus not only does transference disqualify the rule's function as a third party, but it tends to unite the interpreter and the transference-object, and to turn resistance towards analysis into resistance towards the analyst. This is surely an immense disadvantage for the method.

The objectivising distance was indispensable for transference to be understood as a symptomatic phenomenon. By the same logic, its interpretation was seen as containing the principle of its resolution. But if transference is turned against transference, it also means suggestion is turned against suggestion (Freud), in which the reference to thirdness tends to be lost in the dual relationship, and meaning gives way to force.

If transference lends itself so readily to resistance, is it not also because its interpretation is too closely tied up with the aim of lifting its resistance, and perhaps of denying the analyst's desire? Exaggerating slightly, Lacan said that there is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself. You will recall the metaphor Freud employed to illustrate the impossibility of allowing the patient the right of reserve or asylum. Resistance would make its home there just as criminals would take refuge in churches if there were a round-up that respected their sanctuary in such places. Is it not the case that the exigency of relating everything that happens to the transference contributes to making transference the favoured refuge of resistance, in response to the round-up approach of the method?

THE ANALYTIC SITUATION

1) The dialectics of transference and its interpretation constitutes a source of methodological malaise owing to the ambiguity it introduces into the conception of the analytic situation. It was noticeable in a certain outlook that prevailed at the time of my training, which claimed that the situation was as neutral as the analyst and his mirror-function. It was supposed to guarantee the spontaneity of transference, itself a condition of its analysability. However, this notion of spontaneity has long been marked by a striking ambiguity; for it has been understood as meaning that the analyst and the situation 'play no part' in the development of transference (instead of simply pointing out that the reserve of the former and the invariance of the latter make it easier to understand). Thus, in 1950, Macalpine caused a sensation by describing transference as induced (Macalpine, 1950), rediscovering what Freud had written in 1912. This occultation can be interpreted as an after-effect of the mourning of neurotica, was the demand—necessary if one was to objectivise the psychical reality of the transference fantasy—that no seducer should be subject to incriminations.

In correlation with this, because the method was preoccupied for the most part with the lifting of infantile amnesia and reconstructing the past, transference was inevitably considered from the angle of its purely repetitive dimension; accordingly, its interpretation was supposed to uncover the contents of its amnesic memory (Green). From this point of view, interpreting the transference necessarily implied an aspect of refutation, rectifying its

illusion by means of the 'neutral' reality of the situation.

2) Insofar as the actualisation of transference represents the vehicle of analytic action, a more open and complex conception—but also more ambiguous—of the analytic situation is both required and permitted. It raises in a different way the question of creating thirdness.

a) On the one hand, there is no reason to describe transference as pure repetition; it displaces, invests, introjects and projects in a (more or less) discriminating manner. It is psychical work that is symbolic or potentially symbolising. It introduces *difference into repetition*, which was even more evident for Freud when, *a contrario*, he encountered transferences in which reproductions emerged of an 'unwished-for exactitude' (1920, p. 18), evoking a compulsion to repeat going beyond the pleasure principle.

The spontaneity of transference can be seen in the way it erupts, takes advantage of circumstances and *creates a happening*. I am tempted to generalise Freud's metaphor on transference-love: a cry of fire is raised during a theatrical performance; for a while, one does not know whether it is part of the performance or whether the theatre is going to catch fire. Once one has decided not to call in the fire brigade, the problem is how to let the performance continue while modifying it so as to be able to integrate the event afterwards. The precious ambiguity of transference is to give tension, more or less intensely, to the continuity of the plot and the discontinuity of the event. For Freud, the analytic situation falls halfway between fiction and reality; one should add between the 'here-and-now' and the 'then-and-elsewhere'. With his concept of the transitional area, Winnicott showed why it was essential that transference not be faced with the dilemma of being a real or a false fire: what matters is the spirit of play in which the ethics of transference is sometimes difficult to distinguish from the principle of the method.

b) On the other hand, the analytic situation is not 'neutral', in the sense of a pure projective surface. It is active in two ways: negatively, because it repudiates through the constraints it imposes; and, positively, because it contains something gratifying and appealing too. Behind the necessary reserve of the manifest offer lurks a latent mixture of frustration and gratification: by proposing his two successive active techniques, Ferenczi simply accentuated what already existed.

The analyst and the situation are both involved in the structuring of the transference process: the principle of a permanent demarcation between the observer and observed is untenable. Moreover, there is scarcely any sense in claiming to be able to describe in an objective manner a direct causal effect of the instruments of analysis: the same element (the couch, the analyst's silence) can, depending on the patient and the moment in question, assume different, even contrary, meanings.

3) The process is thus the result of an *encounter* that cannot be reduced to determining factors: an encounter between the demand—the suffering—of the patient, and the analyst in question. But, in the last resort, it is an encounter *between two differences: that which sustains the transference and that which distinguishes the analytic situation from any other life-situation*.

The dynamics of transference stem from the potential of the encounter: they are nourished by what the situation has to offer to transference investments, quite apart from the analyst's contribution as a person; the investigation by the patient of his internal world can scarcely be separated from the use he makes—for the most part in silence—of the resources of the *site*.[2] One can thus speak of a *situation analysis*[3] (as one speaks of a situation comedy) linked to the

[2] Translator's note: the term 'site' might perhaps have been translated as 'setting'; however, for the author, particularly as a French speaker, the word 'site' has an echo with the term *situation analytique*; and, furthermore, his original use of it carries a signification which he feels is broader than the term 'setting'—cf. Donnet, 1985.

[3] Translator's note: The French here is: 'analytique de situation'.

mobilisation of a *compulsion to represent* (Rolland) that is simply sustained and accompanied by stating the rule.

This compulsion occurs at all levels of psychical *représentance*,[4] from that which is nearest to the psychical delegation of id impulses, or alpha function (Bion) to that which depends on the systems (ego–superego) connected with language. It is remarkable that already in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud had described an antagonistic equilibrium in the session between the narcissistic regressive tendency of figurative thought processes, attracted by hallucinatory fulfilment, and the anti-regressive tendency of objectalising speech. He did not separate, therefore, the *psychisation*[5] of the drive and the socialisation of the psyche, repudiating in advance the false dilemma between drive and object.

On the contrary, the acting out of transference marks speech with the stamp of hysterical acting. Its major concern is to introduce a portion of the hallucinatory charge of unconscious phantasy into speech. It is this factor that gives the analytic situation and interpretation their specific economic and dynamic dimension.

An enactment that is so charged with affective potential presupposes that all the means provided by the situation are used; that is, figurative regression, which makes the session an equivalent of the system sleep-dreams, makes use of the site, the couch and the environment, even if only in order to negativise them perceptively. Speech implies addressing the invisible other and, in so doing, makes a demand on him (Lacan), which means transference. But the enunciation invaded by acting and affect implies a transference *on to speech:* a temporary transformation of the psychical apparatus into a language apparatus (Green).

'Situation analysis' realises the singular, variable configuration of these various forms of transference; and, the question of knowing whether and how transference on to the analyst may be distinguished from transference on to the analytic situation is crucial for the method and the function of thirdness.

4) If I am insisting on situation analysis, it is because the particular use the patient makes of the resources occurs relatively independently of the analyst's interventions, enabling him, in a sufficiently autonomous manner, to become an *analysand*.

We know how far attempts to teach the patient his task as an analysand, to explain how to use analysis, are more or less vain. In order to account for an appropriation that constitutes a reinvention, it is necessary to refer to the *paradoxical nature of Winnicott's idea of 'found–created'*, which basically corresponds to the creativity involved in the spontaneity of transference.

The analyst's role in this appropriation is, first and foremost, not to hinder it; but there are no guarantees. Although one of the most constant functions of his silent listening is to be found here, it has to be noted that an 'additional' effect of interpretive interventions is to show the patient that he is using the situation advisedly, even if negatively.

Here, I am doing no more than point out the extent of the methodological problem posed by including the interpretive function among the resources of the site; particularly where the transference interpretation uttered by the analyst is concerned.

The extent of the problem can be measured in terms of what separates, beyond their understandable differences, two extreme models:

—in the first model, which is very widespread in France, a sort of renunciation of interpreting has resulted in making the silence of the analyst's listening the essential aspect of his role;

—in the second, an intensive and systematic interpretive activity indicates a sort of *obligation* to interpret, the correlate of which is that

[4] Translator's note: A general category including different types of representation and which implies the activity, the movement of representation.

[5] Translator's note: The process of rendering psychic.

the analyst then has to find in his theory the means to defend it.

By laying emphasis on the autonomy the patient has in making personal use of situation analysis, I certainly do not mean to justify the analyst's fetishistic silence. On the contrary, the patient's autonomy may enable the essential resource of interpretation to free itself from an obligation that meant that free association would only consent to give up control over meaning if it could be made up for later on.

In fact, interpretation, when it is mutative—whether it originates from the analysand or the analyst—comes when it wants: it is a matter of *après-coup*; and its emergence is uncertain and unpredictable. Even if it falls within the continuity of the process, it takes effect through the discontinuity of its emergence, of its metaphorical significance. Its additional effect, then, is to rediscover, to *produce* the disjunction between the analyst as interpreter and the analyst as transference-object. This effect of creating thirdness is jeopardised, and even annulled, when the transference does not introduce an element of symbolising difference into what is being repeated. One of the fundamental questions concerning the analytic method is to know whether interpretation can make transference analysable, or if the situation must rely on presymbolic effects.

If interpretation is not to acquire the addictive value of providing meaning, it is necessary, as we have seen, that the patient has been able to invest the couple activity-passivity specific to associative activity, even when the latter serves the work of remembering, (re)constituting his own history and self-interpretation. The analysand does not attempt to apply the rule, but he reinvents it by giving meaning to the dimension of play it offers, the unknown outcome of which remains to be discovered. Perhaps he senses rather quickly that the implementation of the rule is an outcome of the process, and that its deepest implications are closely tied up with the principles of mental functioning that are the foundation of the theory of the analytic method.

THE ANALYSING SITUATION

As it is commonly used, the term 'analytic situation' quite rightly combines the analytic action and the space-time in which it unfolds.

I think it would be useful, nonetheless, to distinguish between the analytic *site* and the analysing situation:

—the analytic site contains the ensemble of what the offer of an analysis constitutes. It includes the analyst at work.

—the analysing situation results, haphazardly, from the sufficiently adequate encounter between the patient and the site. It implies the subjectivised use, through the experience of 'found–created', of the resources of the site and their singular configuration by the patient.

Why the analysing situation?

First, in order to stress the depth of the metapsychological issues involved in appropriating the site and the self-representations implied: for instance, the analyst's silence sustains the crucial experience of solitude in the object's presence. But this experience is not necessarily made explicit or interpreted. As with an iceberg, only a small part of the density and complexity of the process appears on the surface. The tendency of discourse on the method is to ignore the silent process of working through on the intrapsychic level. The notion of the analytic situation is an attempt to get beyond—by integrating it—the dialectic 'transference neurosis–working alliance' in which the role played by the alliance appears to be too reasonable.

Second, to underline the specific functional unity constituted by the ensemble 'analysand–analyst-situation'. That is to say, a binding unity between the patient's intrapsychic processes and their externalisation on the stage of transference; but also between the mental processes of the two protagonists, to the extent of realising, through the interplay of transference and countertransference, an activity of co-thought, a field (Baranger), a partial fusion, by

bringing into play primitive identificatory processes, i.e. a shared area of play.

The analytic framework makes it possible to contain the complexity of these entangled processes; but the bilateral internalisation of what it represents symbolically is what enables it to ensure, through its materiality, the vicariousness of the element of thirdness at the height of transference–countertransference crises and the extreme situations they give rise to (Roussillon).

Through the self-regulated interplay of these exchanges, the analytic situation takes the form of a structure integrating the analysand-analyst couple in its capacity for self-organisation, as well as the dynamic processes of its disorganisations-reorganisations.

Third, and finally, to indicate that this structure is the vehicle of a self-investigating dynamic, arising from the potential of the encounter. The process unfolding within the analysing situation has its own trajectory and is informed by the immanence of a terminable analysis. Ultimately, this end can only be defined by *the exhaustion of the resources of the site*, as it has been actualised, at a given moment in the relationship between such and such a patient and his analyst. This temporality, which is included in the very dynamics of the transference experience of illusion-disillusion—which is so lacking in interminable analysis—ensures the latent presence of a function creating thirdness that is actualised through interpretation.

It sheds meaning on the paradoxical words of a patient at the heart of his transference process: 'I come to my session to ask myself why I come'. The process owes temporality its capacity to be the exploration through speaking of the transference experience (Rolland).

ADDENDUM

In memory of S. Viderman:

To illustrate the way in which the rule works, here is a scene from the beginning of my own analysis, forty years ago: my memory of it has retained the intensity of a screen-memory.

1) It concerns a session that was to end at eight p.m. Sensing or anticipating that it was about to end, I stopped talking. In the silence, the church tower nearby marked out eight strokes. The sign I was expecting was not forthcoming and instead my anxiety increased. I exclaimed: 'But I don't want you to give me more than my time'. I was both surprised and reassured by what I had just said. My analyst then ended the session.

2) I would like to draw attention here to those aspects of my recollection that remain for me the most striking.

a) the *contrast*, first of all, between my conviction that I had used the situation in a way that was both new, improvised and in accordance with its potentialities and, what for me, was the altogether enigmatic dimension of the scene. This contrast shows that the feeling of being an analysand is not necessarily linked to providing meaning through interpretation;

b) my conviction was based, on the spur of the moment, on the actualisation of all the different elements of the site, i.e. the framework (the set time for ending the session); the setting (the scene is unthinkable without the couch and the immanence of the standing position); the analyst (the supposed guardian of the framework and object of the transference); and finally, the rule (I will come back to this).

This unexpected conjunction of circumstances gave me the feeling that I was the author of the whole scene, that I had created what was already there.

c) My conviction was also based on the memory-trace of the transformation that had occurred and been provoked by my enunciation: at the beginning, I was addressing my analyst through action; at the end, I felt that my enunciation had emerged from somewhere far off and had touched me closely, but it was enigmatic and not unpleasant; I can recall just how much the experience of this process needed the support of the analyst's silence.

3) Some comments retrospectively:

a) Later on in my analysis, as a result of interpretation and working through, I was able to discover the various facets of the seduction fantasy of/by the adult that had been actualised on the stage of transference and expressed transparently under the cover of negation. It was no easier to integrate the traumatic resonance of the eight strokes of the clock, evoking the inexorability of time, separation and death.

It seemed to me, then, that in the scene, what I had said had had the effect, through my identification with the voice of the superego ideal, of making me the one who decided the moment of ending in order to avoid being subjected to it.

My pleasant feeling of being an analysand was perhaps above all an expression of my satisfaction at having taken the place of the one who was safeguarding the frame. Was this a maniacal defence or an experience of 'found–created'?

In any case, the analysand's autonomy cannot be located—any more than the working alliance—outside the field of transference and its interpretation. It can, occasionally, be interpreted as a defence against the experience of dependency; but who would this interpretation be addressed to if this transference dependency were not given metaphorical form by the transference itself?

b) In the scene itself I did not say (scrupulously) to my analyst, 'I am feeling anxious about the idea that …', and even less 'I have just had the fantasy that …' My enunciation had the status of acting out. How, then, did this form of acting out use the analytic situation more fully than the two others that would have been the expression of an insight?

First of all it involved the experience of confusing, projectively, the analyst with the other—whoever it was who wanted to keep me—before I refound the person of whom I would not have gone as far as saying that I 'had always known' that he was going to end the session, and that by identifying with me, he was leaving me the time to say: nothing can replace the fact that 'returning to oneself comes about by making a détour through the other' (Green, 1981).

It was also the complexity of what was happening in the gap between psychical factuality (the affect of silence, hearing the clock, increasing anxiety) and speech:

—first, the anxiety was enigmatic and the enunciation ego-syntonic (I know what I do not want);

—second, my enunciation, which relieved my anxiety (repression), then became enigmatic and, in this sense, it was offered to the analyst by the analysand. It assumed the value of a *signifier*. It is the ensemble of this 'mix-up' that has an irreplaceable subjectivising significance.

The underlying issue here is that of a privileged mode of overcoming the barrier of repression: from the point of view of interpretation, this is accomplished through the associative linking occurring between anxiety and the denied representation of a demand for love. But compared with a mere insight, acting out involves an instinctual introjection; it transfers on to the act of speaking the hallucinatory power inherent in the unconscious wishful fantasy. *Speaking hysterically is an ersatz for hallucinatory satisfaction*.

The transference actualisation underlies the possibility of conceiving the effect of interpretation as being similar to a *wave of symbolisation*, containing an optimal conjunction of force and meaning.

TRANSLATIONS OF SUMMARY

La méthode analytique repose sur la capacité de l'esprit à produire une séquence associative et à y discerner, *après-coup*, une logique inconsciente. Dans la pratique sociale de la cure analytique, la méthode se présente comme la mise en oeuvre maîtrisée des conditions à travers lesquelles l'association libre se révèle possible, interprétable et bénéfique. Il existe une contradiction entre la necessité de l'appui sur une théorisation préalable et celle de suspendre un savoir qui risque d'occulter l'authenticité de l'expérience vécue. L'auteur rappelle le lien structurel entre la mise en oeuvre de la règle fondamentale et la situation cadrée à partir de laquelle se déploie le processus

analytique d'investigation transformatrice. Il évoque les problèmes posés à la méthode d'objectivation initiale par la réconaissance du transfert en tant qu'objet d'interprétation trouvé–créé. Il fait valoir que la transformation du patient en analysant suppose l'introjection fonctionelle des éléments divers du site analytique. Il précise le sens qu'il donne à l'expression 'situation analysante'. Un bref exemple illustre la valeur cruciale du processus de l'énonciation.

Die analytische Methode beruht auf der Fähigkeit des Geistes, eine assoziative Sequenz zu bilden und anschliessend deren unbewusste Logik zu erkennen. Innerhalb der sozialen Praxis der analytischen Behandlung zeigt sich die Methode als gemeisterte Inszenierung der Voraussetzung, aufgrund derer freie Assoziation möglich, deutbar und nützlich ist. Es besteht ein Widerspruch zwischen der Notwendigkeit, sich auf frühere Theoriebildung zu verlassen und jener, willentlich ein Wissen aufzugeben, das der Echtheit der Erfahrung dienen könnte. Der Autor erinnert uns an die strukturellen Verbindungen zwischen der Grundregel und den Rahmensituationen, von denen aus der analytische Prozess der umwandelnden Untersuchung stattfinden kann. Er wirft die Probleme auf, die gegen die anfängliche Objektivierungsmethode eingewendet wurden, indem er die Übertragung als erschaffenes/gefundenes Objekt der Deutung anerkennt. Er zeigt, dass die Umwandlung des Patienten in einen Analysanden die funktionelle Introjektion verschiedener im analytischen Setting enthaltener Elemente beinhaltet. Die Bedeutung, die dem Ausdruck „analytische Situation" gegeben wird, wird verdeutlicht. Der entscheidende Wert des Prozesses der Artikulation wird durch ein kurzes Beispiel illustriert.

El método analítico se apoya en la capacidad de la mente para producir una secuencia asociativa y para discernir en ella, a posteriori, una lógica inconsciente. En el ejercicio social de la cura analítica, el método se presenta como la puesta en práctica controlada, de las condiciones a través de las cuales, la asociación libre resulta posible, interpretable y beneficiosa. Existe una contradicción entre la necesidad de apoyarse sobre una teorización previa y la de dejar en suspenso un saber que hace correr el riesgo de ocultar la autenticidad de la experiencia vivida. El autor recuerda el lazo estructural entre la puesta en práctica de la regla fundamental y la situación con un marco, a partir de la cual se despliega el proceso analítico de investigación transformadora. Se refiere también a los problemas que se le plantean al método de objetivación inicial, a causa del reconocimiento de la transferencia como objeto de interpretación encontrado–creado. Defiende que la transformación del paciente en 'analizando' supone la introyección funcional de los diferentes elementos del lugar analítico. Precisa también el sentido que él da a la expresión 'situación analizante'. Un ejemplo breve ilustra el valor crucial del proceso de la enunciación.

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